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Abstract
Individuals’ inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development.
In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask
whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome.
A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an
individual’s incomes from investment and non-investment are equal.  We show that arbitrarily small
errors in the government’s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation
of the high investment outcome.  We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely
limit a government’s ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.
Keywords: Coordination, Public Policy, Income Taxation, Implementation
JEL codes: O21, H231 Introduction
Whenever investment decisions are decentralized but individual returns to investment re-
main dependent on the choices made by others, economic activity may be limited by a
coordination failure among the agents. This observation has often been taken to be par-
ticularly relevant for low-income countries. A large theoretical literature, starting with
Rosenstein and Rodan (1943) and Hirschman (1957), has explored how coordination fail-
ures can cause poor countries and people to stay poor (see, e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny 1989, Matsuyama 1996 and Becker, Murphy and Tamura 1990).
If one takes seriously the view that economic growth is inhibited by coordination fail-
ures, then a natural question is whether suitably designed public policies can prevent such
failures. Import substitution industrialization policies, for instance, are widely viewed as
just such an attempt, although there is widespread scepticism about their success (Krueger
1997 and Bhagwati 1993). In general, however, discussions of whether or not a government
can coordinate economic development have remained largely informal and have rarely pro-
gressed beyond the observation that a government’s inability to directly observe individual
investment decisions may prevent such coordination (Rodrik 1996, and again Krueger 1997).
Put diﬀerently, the government’s inability to observe individual actions makes coordination
a multi-agent moral hazard problem.
However, as is now well known, the appropriate design of contracts can mitigate agency
concerns in moral hazard problems. In the standard example, an employee is paid according
to observable output. A suitably designed wage scheme will induce the agent to take the
employer’s preferred, though unobservable, action. In a public policy context (e.g., Mirrlees’
1971 seminal work on income taxation) the analogue is a tax and transfer policy which
depends on observed outcomes (an individual’s market income), but not on unobserved
actions. In keeping with this line of research, this paper examines whether a tax and
transfer policy can be used as a coordination device when the government does not observe
individual actions.
In the canonical coordination game an agent’s income depends both on her action and the
2actions of all other agents in the economy. As a result the game has multiple Pareto-ranked
equilibria.1 In this spirit, we consider an economy in which a continuum of agents must
each decide whether or not to invest.2 The returns to both investment and non-investment
depend on the proportion of investors, which we denote as η. The social optimum is for
all agents to invest. Individual incomes from non-investment exceed those from investment
when η = 0, with the opposite true when η = 1. Hence, although it is an equilibrium for
all agents to invest, it is also an equilibrium for no agent to invest. Moreover, there is an
intermediate level of investment, ˜ η say, at which investment and non-investment generate
the same returns. We cast the problem of coordination of economic activity as a principal-
agent problem in which a single principal — the government — seeks to provide multiple
agents with the incentive to invest.
If the government can directly observe individual investments then coordinating the
full-investment equilibrium is straightforward. Indeed, Rodrik (1996) has argued that in-
formation gathering by institutions such as the Japanese MITI was key to the success of
the industrial policies pursued by East Asian governments. However, previous discussions
of government coordination have also noted that, in practice, a government bureaucrat
may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to distinguish between genuine investment and consumption disguised
as investment. That is, a government’s lack of information constrains its ability to foster
coordination and hence economic development.
Our main results both reinforce and develop the view that information is critical to
successful coordination — and that in practice, the informational hurdle is hard to clear. We
start from the point where previous informal discussions end: is there anything a government
can do if it cannot observe individual investment decisions? We allow a government to make
transfers to individuals based on their incomes, and likewise to engage in income taxation.3
1Cooper (1999) reviews the coordination game literature, while Hoﬀ (2000) and Ray (2000) discuss their
relevance for modeling market outcomes in low income countries.
2Our description of the investment game is similar to those in “big push” models of development –
industrialization is individually proﬁtable only if a suﬃciently large number of agents industrialize (see, for
instance, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989)).
3Since we do not impose budget balancing, these two options allow for the same outcomes.
3Given this, we ask whether there exists tax/transfer schemes such that all agents investing
is the only stable equilibrium.
Recall that when ˜ η individuals invest, investment and non-investment yield the same
income. Investors and non-investors appear identical to the government at the investment
level ˜ η; as such, there is necessarily an equilibrium at that point. Our main results relate
to the diﬃculties this engenders for successful coordination. Speciﬁcally, it is reasonable to
regard a government coordination policy as successful only if it leaves η = 1 as the only
stable equilibrium. In other words, ˜ η must be an unstable equilibrium when the policy is
in place. To ensure this the government’s policy must leave investors with higher post-
tax/transfer income both when just more and just less than ˜ η of the population invest.
Consider ﬁrst the class of government policies in which each individual’s transfer depends
only on that individual’s pre-transfer income. Coordination is only feasible if the govern-
ment knows the exact value of ˜ η, along with the corresponding income at that point. We
show (Proposition 2) that if instead it makes even an arbitrarily small mistake in identifying
these values, then coordination fails. The reason is that the policy creates a stable equi-
librium in the vicinity of ˜ η. To the extent small misperceptions are inevitable, we interpret
this result as indicating that coordination using this class of policies is impossible.
Second, we consider a broader class of government policies in which each individual’s
transfer can also depend on the full distribution of incomes in the “economy.” In this case
coordination is often feasible. Speciﬁcally, if the externality associated with investment is
suﬃciently strong then a government can successfully use information on the proportion
of investors at diﬀerent income levels to ensure that post-transfer returns from investment
always exceed those from non-investment. However, we believe that such policies are much
harder for a government to successfully implement. In particular, the relevant “economy”
is the set of individuals actually aﬀected by the externalities in question. If the government
fails to correctly identify this, then it likewise misidentiﬁes the income distribution, and its
coordination policy will fail. This problem is made even more relevant by the fact that
investment games are typically played out at the sectoral level, and an economy consists
4of multiple sectors. Again, the informational requirements that a coordination policy must
meet appear substantial.
Related literature
Our analytic approach is related to the literature on implementation in moral-hazard set-
tings — see Ma (1988), Arya, Glover and Young (1995), Arya, Glover and Hughes (1997),
and Chung (1999).4 The ﬁrst three of these papers address a problem noted by Mookherjee
(1984): when a principal seeks to provide incentives to many agents, the optimal incentive
scheme may possess multiple equilibria. Ma shows that, in general, the use of “integer”
message games can eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria. The papers of Arya, Glover and
their co-authors rule out the use of such mechanisms on grounds of realism, and show that
in speciﬁc instances of the many-agent incentive problem unwanted equilibria can still be
eliminated. Closest to us is Chung (1999) who examines whether a speciﬁc class of policies,
aﬃrmative action policies, can implement the unique eﬃcient (human capital) investment
equilibrium.
Paper outline
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the economic
environment. Section 3 identiﬁes necessary features of a tax scheme which implements
the high investment outcome. Section 4 considers implementation via policies based on
individual income, and Section 5 policies which also condition on the income distribution.
Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results under alternative assumptions and Section
7 concludes.
4The standard implementation problem concerns an adverse-selection setting (see Maskin 1999). That
is, agents ﬁrst learn their type, which a planner then seeks to induce them to report truthfully.
52 Environment
2.1 Basics
The economy consists of a continuum of risk-neutral agents. Every agent faces a discrete
investment choice, a ∈ {0,1}, where a = 1 is interpreted as investment. Investment choice
a yields a monetary return of y ≡ fa (η), where η is the fraction of agents who invest.
We assume fa ( ) is a continuous, twice-diﬀerentiable function. An agent’s decision to
invest generates positive spill-overs for other investors, i.e., f′
1 ( ) > 0. In contrast, f′
0 ( ) ≷ 0.
However, f′
0 (.) = 0 at only ﬁnitely many values of η, i.e., investment aﬀects the returns
to non-investment almost everywhere. The externalities investment generates for investors
exceed those generated for non-investors. That is, |f′
1 (.)| > |f′
0 (.)|. Fη denotes the income
distribution when a fraction η invest. The income distribution collapses to a one-point
distribution whenever incomes from investment and non-investment coincide. Otherwise, it
is a two-point distribution — a proportion 1− η of the population has income f0 (η) and a
proportion η income f1 (η).
A principal, who we refer to as the government, seeks to design a mechanism to aﬀect
agents’ investment decisions. We restrict the government to transfer schemes T(y) that
determine the post-transfer income of an agent with pre-tax income y. We consider, in
turn, the cases where T only depends on an agent’s income, y, and where it can also
depend on the full income distribution F. In both cases we assume T is a continuous
function of y and F, in the following sense. Let F denote the set of distribution functions
on the real line that place mass on at most two points. For any pair of sequences {yn} ⊂ ℜ
and {Fn} ⊂ F such that yn → y and Fn (ǫ) → F (x) for all x except the mass points of F,
T (yn,Fn) → T (y,F).5 For the most part we restrict attention to mechanisms that do not
make use of messages; in Section 6 we discuss more general mechanisms of this type.
We impose no other restrictions on T. In particular, we do not require budget balancing
— there is no reason the investment externality should encompass the whole economy.
5That is, convergence in distribution (see, e.g., Billingsley 1995). We discuss the restriction to continuous
tax/transfer functions T in Section 6.
6Finally, when we refer to the economy absent government intervention, we simply mean
T (y,F) ≡ y, i.e., no net taxes or transfers.
2.2 Equilibrium
Given a fraction η of investors, let ∆T (η) denote the gain to an agent from investing instead
of not investing :
∆T (η) ≡ T (f1 (η),Fη) − T (f0 (η),Fη)
We assume that, absent government intervention, full investment (η = 1) maximizes social
welfare, i.e.,
1 ∈ argmax
η
ηf1 (η) + (1 − η)f0 (η)
We deﬁne our concept of equilibrium and stability for this economic environment, and use
these deﬁnitions to characterize a coordination game.
Deﬁnition 1 (Nash equilibrium)
Given a government policy T, a fraction η of agents investing is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if η = 0 and ∆T (0) ≤ 0, or η = 1 and ∆T (1) ≥ 0 or η ∈ (0,1) and ∆T (η) = 0.
Throughout we refer to an equilibrium by the fraction that invest in that equilibrium,
η.
Deﬁnition 2 (Stability)
An equilibrium η is unstable if there exists δ such that either ∆T (η − ε) < 0 for all ε ∈ (0,δ),
or ∆T (η + ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ (0,δ). An equilibrium that is not unstable is stable.
The notion of equilibrium stability consists of asking whether individuals’ optimal in-
vestment strategies are immune to small perturbations of the proportion of investors around
the presumed equilibrium, i.e., to investor noise. Below (see Proposition 2) we show that
arbitrarily small government misperceptions of the economic fundamentals create new sta-
ble equilibria. The sizes of the basins of attraction of the newly created stable equilibria
(i.e., the extent of investor noise) depend on the extent of government misperceptions. It
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Figure 1: A linear example of a coordination game
follows that our deﬁnition of stability is premised on the assumption that investor noise is
less than government noise. If we interpret the notion of equilibrium stability as reﬂecting
the outcome of a learning process among investors (in the face of strategic uncertainty) then
an economic interpretation of this assumption is that, relative to the government, investors
are faster at ‘learning’ about their economic environment.
Since we have assumed that f′
1 > 0 and |f′
1| > |f′
0|, the function ∆T is strictly increasing
absent government intervention (i.e., T (y) ≡ y). Consequently, absent intervention there
are three possible equilibrium sets in our economy: η = 0 is the only stable equilibrium;
η = 1 is only stable equilibrium; and η = 0 and η = 1 are both stable equilibria, with an
unstable equilibrium at a unique investment level point ˜ η ∈ (0,1). For the remainder of
the paper we assume that the last of these three cases holds, and refer to our economy as
a coordination game. Figure 1 illustrates a coordination game. (In Section 7, we brieﬂy
discuss the problem of ensuring full investment when the only stable equilibrium absent
intervention is η = 0. This case is, of course, a manifestation of the “free-rider” problem.6)
6A simple example of the free-rider problem in our economy is f0(η) = 5/8 + η/2 and f1(η) = η.
Investment has positive externalities for both investors and non-investors, the socially eﬃcient investment
level is η = 1, yet the only equilibrium is at η = 0.
8Since investment and non-investment incomes coincide at the investment level ˜ η ∈ (0,1),
necessarily ∆T (˜ η) = 0 for all government policies T. That is, investment by a fraction ˜ η of
agents is an equilibrium. Given this, the most that can be hoped of a government policy
is that it leave η = 1 as a stable equilibrium, but ˜ η as an unstable equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 3 (Implementation)
A policy T implements η if η is the only stable equilibrium.
Implementation when individual actions are publicly observable is straightforward: tax
the socially ineﬃcient action, or subsidize the socially eﬃcient action.7 More formally, con-
sider the policy T (a = 1,y,F) = y and T (a = 0,y,F) = f1 (0)−ε, some ε > f1 (0)−y. This
policy only taxes non-investors, such that they prefer investing. Under this choice of T, full-
investment is the only equilibrium. The remainder of the paper considers implementation
when agents’ incomes, but not actions, are observable.
3 Implementation
In selecting the parameters of the tax and transfer scheme the government’s aim is to
eliminate the no-investment equilibrium (η = 0), while preserving full investment as a
stable equilibrium (η = 1). We start by noting:
Proposition 1 (∆ must be positive)
Suppose that either (1) ∆T ≡ 0 over some interval [η − ε,η] ⊂ [0,1], or (2) ∆T (η) < 0 for
some η ∈ [0,1]. Then there is a stable equilibrium to the left of η.
Proof of Proposition 1: The returns to investment and non-investment f0 and f1 are
continuous in η. Continuity of T implies that ∆T is continuous. If condition (1) holds,
clearly any point η′ ∈ [η − ε,η] is a stable equilibrium. If condition (2) holds then either
there exists η′ < η such that ∆T (η′) > 0, and so there must be a stable equilibrium between
η′ and η; or else ∆T (0) < 0, in which case η = 0 is a stable equilibrium. QED
7This was the case considered by Pigou (1932).
9Proposition 1 immediately implies two restrictions on implementation via income-based
incentive schemes.
The ﬁrst restriction relates to the fact that an individual’s pre-transfer income from
non-investment exceeds that from investment when the fraction of investors is less than
˜ η. From Proposition 1, we know that any tax and transfer scheme that implements full
investment must leave investors with a higher after-transfer income than non-investors.
Consequently, the tax and transfer scheme must be non-monotonic in pre-transfer income:
over some range, income must be taxed at more than 100%. An immediate corollary is that
implementation is infeasible if economic agents can costlessly burn money.
More formally, assume an agent with true income y can costlessly reduce her income to
any θ ∈ [0,y]. This transforms a tax/transfer scheme as follows. Given T, an agent chooses
income θ ∈ argmax˜ θ∈[0,y] T
 
˜ θ
 
. (Since T is continuous and [0,y] is compact, T (θ) has a
well-deﬁned maximum over [0,y].) So the eﬀective transfer scheme is
Teff (y) = max
˜ θ∈[0,y]
T
 
˜ θ
 
.
Trivially Teff is weakly increasing in y. It is easily shown to be continuous. Consequently:
Corollary 1 If agents can costlessly burn money, implementation of full investment is
impossible.
The second restriction relates to the existence of an investment level ˜ η at which investor
and non-investor incomes coincide. Proposition 1 tells us that implementation requires that
the post-transfer returns from investment must everywhere (weakly) exceed those from non-
investment. However, if investment entails even a small non-pecuniary cost ǫ then under
any tax/transfer policy investors are worse oﬀ than non-investors when the investment level
is ˜ η. As such, a stable equilibrium will exist to the left of ˜ η:
Corollary 2 If investment entails a strictly positive non-pecuniary cost then implementa-
tion of full investment is impossible.
10Corollaries 1 and 2 identify two serious impediments to the possibility of implementing
full investment. In the next section, we show that even if a non-monotonic tax/transfer
scheme is viable (i.e., burning money is not possible), and there are no non-pecuniary costs
of investment implementation of full investment remains extremely challenging. Consistent
with informal discussions of coordination policies, our analysis highlights the key role played
by government information (or its lack thereof).
4 Policies based on individual income
We start with the case where the transfer policy, T, can only be conditioned on an agent’s
income. We know from Proposition 1 that implementing full investment requires that after
taxes and transfers investment yields a higher income level for all η. Non-investment yields
a higher income when less than ˜ η invest but not when more than ˜ η invest. Hence, T must
ensure that higher incomes are penalized when fewer than ˜ η invest, but rewarded when
more than ˜ η invest.
It follows that the tax/transfer policy T must be at a minimum at the income level at
which investment and non-investment incomes coincide, i.e., at ˜ y = f0 (˜ η) = f1 (˜ η). When
T is diﬀerentiable, a somewhat loose argument is as follows. Since ∆T (˜ η) = 0, it follows
from Proposition 1 that ∆T must be at a local minimum at ˜ η — else, there exists a point η
such that ∆T (η) < 0, which is inconsistent with implementation of full-investment. Taking
derivatives of ∆T gives
∆′
T (η) = f′
1 (η)T′ (f1 (η)) − f′
0 (η)T′ (f0 (η))
∆′′
T (˜ η) =
 
f′
1 (˜ η)
2 − f′
0 (˜ η)
2
 
T′′ (˜ y)
Then ∆′
T (˜ η) = 0 implies T′ (˜ y), while ∆′′
T (˜ η) ≥ 0 and |f′
1| > |f′
0| imply T′′ (˜ y) ≥ 0. More
formally:
Lemma 1 (Intersection points)
Let ˜ η ∈ (0,1) be an investment level at which investment and non-investment incomes
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Figure 2: The tax/transfer scheme T = ˜ y + γ|y − ˜ y|
coincide. Any scheme T that implements full-investment (η = 1) must have a local minimum
at ˜ y = f1 (˜ η).
Proof of Lemma 1: See appendix.
The following example illustrates Lemma 1. Assume income from investment is f1 (η) =
η + x1, while that from non-investment is f0 (η) = x0 − βη. Also, assume β ∈ (0,1),
x0 > x1 and 1 + x1 ≥ x0 − β, so that absent government intervention no-investment and
full-investment are both stable equilibria.
When a fraction ˜ η = x0−x1
1+β invest both investment and non-investment incomes equal
˜ y = x1 + x0−x1
1+β . Lemma 1 suggests it is natural to consider a tax/transfer policy with a
minimum at ˜ y. One class of policies with this property, illustrated in Figure 2, is
T = ˜ y + γ|y − ˜ y|
This speciﬁcation of T is continuous in y and implements η = 1 as follows. First, if
η < ˜ η invest then the pre-transfer incomes of investors are lower than those of non-investors;
but their post-transfer incomes are higher since the externalities experienced by investors
are stronger, and so |f1 (η) − ˜ y| > |f0 (η) − ˜ y|. Second, if η > ˜ η invest then both the pre-
transfer and post-transfer incomes of investors exceed those of non-investors. So ∆T (η) > 0
for all η other than ˜ η, and η = 1 is the only stable equilibrium. Figure 3 provides a graphical
illustration.
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Figure 3: Implementing full-investment: the solid lines represent investment incomes, the
dashed lines non-investment incomes, and the heavy lines after-tax/transfer incomes. For
all η after-tax/transfer incomes are higher for investors than non-investors.
However, implementation is extremely sensitive to small imperfections in government
information. To see this, consider the speciﬁc policy with γ = 1 (so that T (y) = 2˜ y − y for
y ≤ ˜ y, and T (y) = y otherwise) and assume the government wrongly estimates the returns
to investing as f1 (η) + (ˆ x1 − x1), where ˆ x1  = x1. We depict this possibility in Figure 4.
Suppose it overestimates investment returns, i.e., ˆ x1 > x1. In this case, incomes in
the neighborhood of ˜ y are unaﬀected, and consequently ∆T (˜ η) = 0, with ∆T (η) < 0
immediately to the left of ˜ η. There is now a stable equilibrium to the left of ˜ η.
Suppose instead the government underestimates investment returns, i.e., ˆ x1 < x1.
Then incomes around ˜ y are reversed, making ˜ η a stable equilibrium — whereas absent
the tax/transfer policy it was unstable.
In this example arbitrarily small errors in the government’s knowledge of the economy
cause implementation to fail. We show that this sensitivity of implementation to the gov-
ernment’s information is a general property of the environment.
In more general terms than before, a government may misperceive the returns to in-
vestment as g, in place of the true returns, f1.8 Let G be the metric space consisting of
8Proposition 2 (see below) also holds if we restrict attention to the speciﬁc case analyzed in the example,
i.e., mistakes of the form f1 (η) + k, for some constant k.
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Figure 4: Errors create interior stable equilibrium: The solid lines represent investment
incomes, the dashed lines non-investment incomes, and the heavy lines after-tax/transfer
incomes. We see that a small upwards bias in identifying the income level ˜ y at which
incomes coincide creates a stable equilibrium at ˜ η.
all continuous, increasing and twice-diﬀerentiable functions from [0,1] to the positive real
line, with metric  g − h  =
 
|g − h|∀g,h ∈ G. It is reasonable to regard the government’s
misperception as small whenever  f1 − g  is small, i.e., when
g ∈ {h ∈ G| h − f1  < ε} ≡ Bε (f1)
for some small ε. Given these preliminaries, we deﬁne fragile implementation:
Deﬁnition 4 (Fragility)
Suppose that T implements η. Implementation is fragile if for any ε > 0, implementation
of η is non-generic within Bε (f1), i.e., if the set
{g ∈ Bε (f1)|T implements η in economy (f0,f1 = g)}
is nowhere dense in Bε (f1). Implementation is non-fragile if it is not fragile.
It is worth pausing to compare the deﬁnitions of stability and fragility. In the above
example the government’s misperception of f1 creates interior stable equilibria with basins
14of attraction that extend only a distance
2β(ˆ x1−x1)
(1−β)(1+β) to the right of the newly created stable
equilibrium (see Appendix C). Consequently, when the government’s misperception is small,
the size of trembles required for agents to escape the interior equilibrium is likewise small.
By deﬁnition, equilibrium stability incorporates some notion of strategic uncertainty
among investors – an equilibrium is stable if investors’ optimal strategy is invariant to
small ﬂuctuations in the proportion of investors. In contrast, implementation is fragile if
generic small misperceptions of investment returns f1 by the government cause implemen-
tation to fail. It follows that implicit in our deﬁnition of fragility is the assumption that
a government’s informational misperceptions are of greater “magnitude” then exogenous
“trembles” in agents’ investment decisions.
It is possible to provide an economic interpretation of this assumption. If we interpret
stability of equilibrium in terms of the dynamic learning process among agents (in the face
of strategic uncertainty), then (loosely speaking) our deﬁnition of fragility assumes that the
government learns more slowly than investors.
The observation that implementation was very sensitive to small informational errors in
the above example generalizes to:
Proposition 2 (Implementation is fragile)
Implementation of full investment by a tax/transfer policy T is fragile.
Proof of Proposition 2: See appendix.
How bad is it when implementation fails? Suppose that a tax/transfer policy T fails
to achieve a local minimum at a point ˜ y = f1 (˜ η) = f0 (˜ η), where ˜ η is the investment level
at which investment and non-investment incomes coincide. Then Lemma 1 implies that a
stable equilibrium exists in the interval [0,˜ η + ε], where ε > 0 can be made arbitrarily small.
A stable equilibrium η > 0 implies a positive level of investment, whereas the equilibrium
η = 0 implies no investment. In the example considered above investment generates a
negative externality on non-investors (f′
0 < 0). Hence, any equilibrium η ∈ (0,˜ η + ε] is
socially worse than the no-investment equilibrium η = 0.
155 Policies based on the income distribution
Implementation of full investment requires the use of a tax/transfer scheme that is non-
monotonic in income. That is, post-transfer income must be higher for agents with lower
income when η < ˜ η with the opposite true when η > ˜ η. If it has a minimum somewhere else
— even if very close by — then implementation fails. Failure of implementation is generic
when the tax/transfer scheme only conditions on individual income and the government
lacks perfect information about economic fundamentals, speciﬁcally the value of ˜ η.
We now examine whether non-fragile implementation is feasible if the government can
also condition the tax/transfer scheme on the income distribution Fη.9,10 We show that
non-fragile implementation is possible if ˜ η  = 1/2 and the externality on investment returns
is suﬃciently strong.
Figure 5 provides the intuition. For investment levels other than ˜ η, the income distri-
bution has two mass points. We denote the proportion of the population at the higher of
these mass points by ξ. Figure 5 shows the relation of ξ to η when ˜ η < 1/2. When η < ˜ η
non-investors have higher incomes, and so ξ = 1−η; conversely, when η > ˜ η investors have
higher incomes and ξ = η.
For non-fragile implementation, the important point is that income distributions with
ξ ≤ 1/2 only arise when the investment level is between ˜ η and ˆ η = 1
2 > ˜ η. Moreover, for
a large enough investment externality, the income of investors when η > 1/2 exceeds the
income level of both non-investors and investors for any η < ˜ η.
9Section 7 discusses whether it is realistic to assume that T can depend on the income distribution.
10The implementation problem when transfers can depend on the full income distribution is related to
Battaglini (Forthcoming). The main diﬀerence between our paper and his is that we show unique imple-
mentation of the full-investment equilibrium in our environment. Battaglini’s more general results only
establish uniqueness of implementation in coalition-proof equilibria. In our environment no-investment is
not a coalition-proof equilibrium whenever f0 (η) < f1 (1) (this is implied by f
′
0 < 0 and the assumption
that full-investment is socially eﬃcient). Thus the coordination problem at the heart of our paper (and, in-
deed, in much of the literature on coordination failures) simply disappears if we only consider coalition-proof
equilibria.
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Figure 5: The fraction ξ with an income equal to the higher income as a function of the
investment level (shown for ˜ η < 1/2).
Non-fragile implementation can then be achieved as follows. If ξ ≤ 1/2, it must be that
η > ˜ η, and so individuals with higher incomes should receive higher post-transfer incomes.
Moreover, if ξ > 1/2 but the higher income exceeds maxη∈[0,˜ η] f0 (η), then again it must
be that η > ˜ η, and so individuals with higher incomes should receive higher post-transfer
incomes. Finally, if ξ > 1/2 but the higher income level is less than maxη∈[0,˜ η] f0 (η) then
it must be that η < ˜ η, and so individuals with higher incomes should receive lower post-
transfer incomes.
A similar scheme is possible when ˜ η > 1/2 (see the proof of Proposition 3). Moreover, it
is worth stressing that the requirement that the externality is suﬃciently strong is suﬃcient
but not necessary. That is, all that is required is that when ξ > 1/2, the government
can robustly distinguish the distribution when η = 1 − ξ invest from that when η = ξ
invest. When externalities are strong this is easily established, but it will be true much
more generally. However, for the purposes of presenting a reasonably concise constructive
proof, we focus on the case of strong externalities. Formally, our result is:
Proposition 3 (Non-fragile implementation)
Provided the externality on investment is suﬃciently large (i.e., f′
1 large enough), and ˜ η  =
1/2, there exists a tax/transfer policy T such that for all ˆ f1 suﬃciently close to f1 full-
17investment is the only stable equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3: The text above gives the main idea. The main diﬃculty
encountered in the formal proof is deﬁning T such that it is continuous on the space F of
distributions. The proof is relegated to the appendix.
6 Some extensions
We conclude our analysis with a discussion of the robustness of our results to four features
of our model.
6.1 Continuity of Tax Scheme
Our analysis assumes that the tax/transfer policy T is continuous — both in an agent’s
income y and in the income distribution F when this is also an argument. Does this assump-
tion matter? The main issue with allowing T to depend on incomes y in a discontinuous
fashion is that it allows the government to eliminate equilibria in very unconvincing ways.
For instance, consider the following simple example. The return to investment is f1 (η) = η
while that to non-investment is f0 (η) =
1+2η
4 . Consider the tax/transfer policy
T (y) =



−y if y ≤ 3/8
y if y > 3/8
Since f0 (η) ≤ 3/8 whenever η ≤ 1/4 while f1 (η) ≤ 3/8 whenever η ≤ 3/8, this implies
∆T (η) =

   
   
−η +
1+2η
4 if η ∈
 
0, 1
4
 
−η −
1+2η
4 if η ∈
 1
4, 3
8
 
η −
1+2η
4 if η ∈
 3
8,1
 
That is, ∆T (η) is strictly positive for η ≤ 1/4, jumps to being negative and decreasing over
(1/4,3/8], and then is increasing over (3/8,1]. The only stable equilibrium is η = 1.
However, there is a strong sense in which η = 1/4 should be considered a stable equi-
librium. If just less than η = 1/4 invest, then more agents will invest; while if just more
18than η = 1/4 invest, then fewer agents invest. Requiring that the tax/transfer policy T be
continuous in y avoids such problems.
With regard to tax/transfer policies based on the income distribution, it suﬃces to note
that, a fortiori, Proposition 3 would still hold if T were allowed to be discontinuous.
6.2 Message Games
Thus far we have restricted attention to tax/transfer policies that rely solely on pre-tax
incomes observed by the government. We now examine whether the government can do
better by using a scheme where it also collects messages from agents.
We restrict attention to ﬁnite message spaces; we denote the message space by M.11 We
also continue to distinguish between schemes which only make use of individual incomes,
and those that use the full distribution.
A scheme that uses only individual incomes and individual messages is equivalent to one
using only individual incomes. To see this, consider a scheme T (y,m) in which the agent’s
after-transfer income is determined by his own pre-transfer income y and message m ∈ M.
Deﬁne the scheme ˆ T (y) ≡ maxm T (y,m): that is, for any income y the government knows
which message(s) provide an agent with the highest payoﬀ, and so can design an alternate
scheme that directly embeds this information. Clearly ˆ T has the same equilibria as T.
Second, suppose a scheme can condition both on the distribution of incomes and the
distribution of messages. Similarly to above, the equilibria under such a mechanism are
the same as those under a suitably deﬁned scheme in which messages are not used. We
provide the details of this claim in the appendix; broadly speaking, the government can
deﬁne a message-free scheme ˆ T that matches T when equilibrium messages are reported.
6.3 Nash Implementation
We have focused throughout on Nash implementation: full-investment is implemented if and
only if it is a Nash equilibrium under the tax/transfer policy in eﬀect. However, alternate
11This avoids the possibility of “tail-chasing” schemes.
19notions of implementation are possible. For example, one might instead ask whether full-
investment is undominated Nash implementable: that is, is there a policy T under which
full investment is the only equilibrium when agents play undominated strategies?12
In our setting, undominated Nash implementation is straightforward. Recall that, by
assumption, f1 (1) > maxη f0 (η). Choose ˆ y ∈ (maxη f0 (η),f1 (1)), and consider the policy
T (y) =



0 if y < ˆ y
f1 (1)
y−ˆ y
f1(1)−ˆ y y ≥ ˆ y
.
Under this policy, investment is strictly preferred when everyone else invests. Moreover,
at any investment level η, an agent’s income from not investing is f0 (η) < ˆ y, and so
T (ˆ y) = 0. This is at least weakly less than the agent’s income from investing. Thus
not investing is a weakly dominated strategy, while investing is an undominated strategy.
Consequently, if we require that agents use undominated strategies a tax/transfer scheme
which conditions on own income implements full investment. Moreover, this scheme is
robust to small informational mistakes.13
More generally, and in terms of ∆T, a policy implements full investment in undominated
Nash if ∆T (η) ≥ 0 for all η, with ∆T (η) > 0 for some η. The proof of Proposition 2 is easily
adapted to deal with this alternate implementation concept, and implies that for non-fragile
implementation in undominated Nash the policy T must be ﬂat over some neighborhood
around ˜ y.
The above example makes clear that this is straightforward to accomplish in our existing
model. However, at least under some perturbations of the model the requirement of
complete ﬂatness of the tax/transfer scheme is surprisingly hard to satisfy. In particular,
consider the following change to the timing of our model to capture the idea that with a
small probability the government will abandon its announced tax/transfer policy:
(1) The government announces its policy T.
12A weakly dominated strategy is one such that an alternative strategy is weakly preferred no matter
what other agents do, and is strictly preferred for at least some choice of strategies by other agents. An
undominated strategy is one that is not weakly dominated.
13We thank the editor for bringing this example to our attention.
20(2) Agents observe whether the state of the world is ω ∈ {L,H}.
(3) Agents decide whether or not to invest.
(4) With probability εω a “regime change” occurs: the government abandons its tax
policy T, and instead adopts T0. For concreteness, we take T0 to be the no-intervention
policy, T0 (y) ≡ y.
(5) The government observes incomes and executes its policy.
From the agents’ perspective, the tax policy when they make their investment decisions
is Tω = (1 − εω)T + εωT0. The key point is that Tω cannot be ﬂat around ˜ y for both
states ω = L,H. As such, non-fragile implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium
is not possible in both states ω = L,H. (In contrast, this modeling perturbation does not
eliminate the possibility of fragile implementation.14)
6.4 Equilibrium stability
A related issue is our deﬁnition of stability. For concreteness, consider the following exam-
ple: f1 (η) = η, f0 (η) = 3/4 − η/2, and a tax policy deﬁned by
T (y) =

   
   
1
2 + γ
 3
8 − y
 
if y < 3
8
1
2 if y ∈
 3
8, 5
8
 
1
2 + γ
 
y − 5
8
 
if y > 5
8
.
It is readily veriﬁed that ∆T (η) is positive up to 3/8, zero from 3/8 to 5/8, and positive
from 5/8 to 1.
Given our current deﬁnition of stability, this tax scheme fails to implement full invest-
ment: investment levels in the range 3/8 to 5/8 are stable equilibria. However, these
equilibria are clearly not as stable as an equilibrium η for which ∆T (η) = 0 and ∆T is
14In particular, in the example we saw that T (y) = ˜ y+γ |y − ˜ y| Nash implements full investment. Under
the possibility of regime change,
Tω =



(1 − εω)(1 + γ) ˜ y + (εω − (1 − εω)γ)y if y ≤ ˜ y
(1 − εω)(1 − γ) ˜ y + ((1 − εω)γ + εω)y if y > ˜ y
Provided (1 − εω)γ > εω for ω = L,H, full investment is the only stable Nash equilibrium for ω = L,H.
21strictly decreasing at η. In particular, if stability relates to small mistakes by agents in
playing the game, over time agents will eventually “escape” to the right from any equilib-
rium in the interval 3/8 to 5/8. In essence, these equilibria may be seen as “short-run”
stable, but “long-run” unstable.
If we alter our deﬁnition of stability so as to classify equilibria of this type as unstable,
then full investment could be (at least) sometimes implemented in a non-fragile way. One
such instance is the above example. However, as with alternate implementation concepts,
Nash implementation here depends critically on the government being able to impose a tax
scheme that is completely ﬂat over the income range around ˜ y. Again, although easily
accomplished in our existing model, this is not possible in the perturbed model sketched
above.
7 Discussion
This paper examines the use of income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.
Generic implementation is infeasible if the scheme only conditions on individual income,
and is sometimes feasible if it conditions on individual income and the income distribution.
The main problem with implementation arises from the existence of a crossover point
˜ η at which incomes from investment and non-investment coincide, not from the existence
of externalities per se. This is clearly seen when we consider implementation in a free-
rider game, that is a game with externalities but a unique (ineﬃcient) equilibrium.15 In a
free-rider game individual returns from investment vary with the number of investors but
are always below those from not-investing. Implementation is straightforward: choose a
tax/transfer that rewards those with lower pre-tax incomes. Observe that f′
1 > f′
0 implies
15The economics literature on how to achieve eﬃciency in the presence of externalities has, almost ex-
clusively, focused on free-rider games. Two much studied examples are the “tragedy of the commons”
games where common access to resources lead agents to choose consumption levels in excess of the social
optimum (see, e.g., Gordon 1954), and “team production games ” where, given a joint production process,
team members under-provide eﬀort (Holmstr¨ om 1982; also see Legros and Matthews 1993; and Battaglini,
Forthcoming).
22that f1 (η)−f0 (η) is strictly increasing. Since full-investment is not an equilibrium f1 (η) <
f0 (η) for all η < 1. A policy of the form T (y) = Y − λy, where Y and λ > 0 are constants
rewards those with lower pre-transfer incomes. Thus T (f1 (η)) > T (f0 (η)) for all η < 1.
That is, full-investment (η = 1) is the only stable equilibrium. Moreover, implementation
is insensitive to small errors in the government’s knowledge of the returns to investment,
f1.
Overall, we are inclined to interpret our results as both reinforcing and developing the
widely held view that limited information constrains a government’s ability to conduct a
successful development policy based on coordination of investment activity. Coordination
using policies that only condition on individual income fails whenever the government has
even arbitrarily small misperceptions regarding the fundamentals of the economy. In con-
trast, the high-investment equilibrium can be implemented with less exact knowledge if the
tax/transfer policy is allowed to depend on the full distribution of incomes. However, the
successful execution of such a policy, in turn, presents its own informational challenges. In
particular, it requires that the policy-maker know which individuals are actually aﬀected by
the multiple-equilibria generating externality. In practice, this is likely to be a non-trivial
matter. To see this, consider an economy populated by many diﬀerent groups. Individuals
in each group (separately) decide whether to invest in a group-speciﬁc technology. The pos-
itive externality generated by investment may only apply across individuals adopting the
same technology. If the principal does not know the group identity of agents, and if there
are many groups, then the income distribution for each group is unobservable (Lanjouw
and Lanjouw 2001 discuss the widespread coexistence of multiple heterogeneous sectors in
developing countries).
A quite diﬀerent concern about mechanisms which depend on the whole income distri-
bution is that they may require more commitment by the government than those which do
not. For instance, suppose only the government observes all agents’ incomes, while each
agent only observes his/her income. Then ex post the government will be tempted to im-
plement the transfer policy minF∈F T (y,F): that is, give each agent the smallest transfer
23consistent with his/her individual income. Only tax/transfer policies that are independent
of the income distribution are immune from this type of problem.16
We would like to conclude with a methodological counter to our policy pessimism. A rich
literature has developed and used the techniques of implementation theory to analyze the
eﬃcient provision of public goods. However, few researchers have applied these techniques
to the ﬁeld of development economics.17 This paper, we hope, both demonstrates the
importance of these techniques for development economics and, more speciﬁcally, suggests
their usefulness for identifying policy mechanisms which are both feasible and robust to
informational constraints.
16The auctions literature analyzes the possibility that mechanisms in which an agent’s allocation depends
on other agents’ messages may be prone to cheating by the principal. Vickrey (1961) notes that a “second-
price method may not be automatically self-policing to quite the same extent as the top-price method.”
Porter and Shoham (2003) show that a second-price auction collapses to a ﬁrst-price auction when the seller
can costlessly “invent” bids.
17Exceptions include Rai (2002), who studies the design of credit programs, and Besley and Coate (1992),
who analyze targeting of public work programs.
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27A Appendix: Proofs
The proof of Lemma 1 requires the following result:
Lemma 2
Let T : ℜ → ℜ be a continuous function, with ˆ y, ˜ y ∈ ℜ such that T (ˆ y) < T (˜ y). Then there
exists ˇ y  = ˜ y such that |ˇ y − ˜ y| ≤ |ˆ y − ˜ y| and T (y) > T (ˇ y) for all y such that |y − ˜ y| < |ˇ y − ˜ y|.
That is, we can ﬁnd a point ˇ y such that at all points closer to ˜ y the function T is strictly
greater than at ˇ y (and ˇ y itself is closer to ˜ y than is ˆ y).
Proof of Lemma 2: For any ε > 0 and y ∈ ℜ let Bε (y) denote the open interval
(y − ε,y + ε), while ¯ Bε (y) denotes the closed interval [y − ε,y + ε]. The proof is by con-
tradiction. Suppose that contrary to the claimed result for any ˇ y ∈ ¯ B|ˆ y−˜ y| (˜ y)\{˜ y} there
exists a y ∈ B|ˇ y−˜ y| (˜ y) such that T (y) ≤ T (ˇ y).
Since the function T is continuous it must obtain its inﬁmum value over the closed
interval ¯ B|ˆ y−˜ y| (˜ y). That is, the set A ≡ argminy∈ ¯ B|ˆ y−˜ y|(˜ y) T (y) is non-empty. Deﬁne
y− = sup{y ∈ A : y ≤ ˜ y} and y+ = inf {y ∈ A : y ≥ ˜ y}, and then deﬁne ˇ y as whichever of
y+ and y− is closer to ˜ y.18 That is, ˇ y is essentially the element of A that is closest to ˜ y.
By continuity T (ˇ y) = miny∈ ¯ B|ˆ y−˜ y|(˜ y) T (y) ≤ T (ˆ y) < T (˜ y). By supposition, there exists
y ∈ B|ˇ y−˜ y| (˜ y) such that T (y) ≤ T (ˇ y). But then y must lie in A, and is strictly closer to ˜ y
than ˇ y — a contradiction. QED
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that T does
not have a local minimum at ˜ y.
Recall |f′
1| > |f′
0|, and that both f0 and f1 are twice-diﬀerentiable. A straightforward
application of the mean-value theorem implies that there exists an ε > 0 such that
|f1 (η) − ˜ y| > |f0 (η) − ˜ y| for all η ∈ (˜ η − ε,˜ η + ε) (1)
18In the case of ties, set ˇ y = y−. Also, if {y ∈ A : y ≥ ˜ y} is empty then simply deﬁne ˇ y = y−, while if
{y ∈ A : y ≤ ˜ y} is empty deﬁne ˇ y = y+.
28That is, for all investment levels close enough to ˜ η the income from investing is further from
˜ y than is the income from not investing.
By assumption ˜ y is not a local minimum of T. So since f1 is strictly increasing and
continuous, there must exist some ˆ η ∈ (˜ η − ε,˜ η + ε) such that T (f1 (ˆ η)) < T (˜ y). Since
T is strictly below T (˜ y) at ˆ y ≡ f1 (ˆ η), it follows that we can ﬁnd a point ˇ y such that T
is strictly lower at ˇ y than at all points nearer ˜ y (Lemma 2 in the appendix gives a formal
proof). Moreover, the point ˇ y is itself at least as close to ˜ y as is ˆ y. Let ˇ η ∈ (˜ η − ε,˜ η + ε)
be such that f1 (ˇ η) = ˇ y. Then by (1),
∆T (ˇ η) = T (f1 (ˇ η)) − T (f0 (ˇ η)) < 0
But then by Proposition 1, T cannot implement full-investment, a contradiction. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: Take any ε > 0, and let G∗ ⊂ Bε (f1) be those speciﬁcations of
investment returns for which T implements full-investment. We show that the set G∗ is
nowhere dense in Bε (f1), i.e., that its closure G∗ has an empty interior.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists an open set H ⊂ G∗. All elements of H
must lie either in G∗ itself, or else arbitrarily close to a member of G∗. Select an element
f∗
1 ∈ H ∩ G∗, and take υ > 0 such that Bυ (f∗
1) ⊂ H. Let η∗ be the investment level at
which f∗
1 (η∗) = f0 (η∗).
Without loss we can assume that f′
0 (η∗)  = 0. Take ηL and ηH so that f0 (ηL) <
f0 (η∗) < f0 (ηH). The heart of the proof consists of establishing:
Claim: For all ηL and ηH suﬃciently close to η∗, then T (f0 (ηL)) = T (f0 (ηH)).
Proof of claim: Suppose to the contrary that γ ≡ |T (f0 (ηL)) − T (f0 (ηH))| > 0.
Choose functions fH
1 and fL
1 from H such that fH
1 (ηH) = f0 (ηL) and fL
1 (ηL) = f0 (ηH).
Whenever ηL and ηH are close enough to η∗, such a choice is possible. Since T is continuous,
there exist δH and δL such that
   
 T
 
fH
1 (ηH)
 
− T (y)
   
  < γ for
   
 fH
1 (ηH) − y
   
  < δH, and
 
   T
 
fL
1 (ηL)
 
− T (y)
 
    < γ for
 
   T
 
fL
1 (ηL)
 
− y
 
    < δL.
While fH
1 and fL
1 may not themselves lie within the set G∗ over which T implements full-
investment, by supposition there exist functions fH
1 ,fL
1 ∈ G∗ such that
   
 fH
1 (ηH) − fH
1 (ηH)
   
  <
29δH and
 
   fL
1 (ηL) − fL
1 (ηL)
 
    < δL. For these functions, Proposition 1 implies that
T
 
fH
1 (ηH)
 
≥ T (f0 (ηH)) (2)
T
 
fL
1 (ηL)
 
≥ T (f0 (ηL)). (3)
By continuity of T, there exist constants θH,θL ∈ (−γ,γ) such that
T
 
fH
1 (ηH)
 
= T
 
fH
1 (ηH)
 
+ θH (4)
T
 
fL
1 (ηL)
 
= T
 
fL
1 (ηL)
 
+ θL. (5)
To complete the proof of our claim, suppose ﬁrst that T (f0 (ηH)) = T (f0 (ηL))+γ. Then
(2) and (4) together imply that
T
 
fH
1 (ηH)
 
+ θH = T (f0 (ηL)) + θH ≥ T (f0 (ηH)) = T (f0 (ηL)) + γ,
a contradiction since |θH| < γ. Likewise, if instead T (f0 (ηL)) = T (f0 (ηH)) + γ then (3)
and (5) together imply that
T
 
fL
1 (ηL)
 
+ θL = T (f0 (ηH)) + θL ≥ T (f0 (ηL)) = T (f0 (ηH)) + γ,
which is again a contradiction.
Back to main proof: The above claim implies that T must be constant over some
open neighborhood around f∗
1 (η∗). To see this, suppose to the contrary that T (y)  =
T (f∗
1 (η∗)) for some y close to f∗
1 (η∗). Then T (ˇ y) = T (y)  = T (f∗
1 (η∗)) for all ˇ y close to
f∗
1 (η∗) on the opposite side of f∗
1 (η∗) from y, contradicting the continuity of T ( ).
It then follows that ∆T ≡ 0 over some interval around η∗. But this contradicts Propo-
sition 1, completing the proof. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: We focus on the case ˜ η < 1/2. The case ˜ η > 1/2 is similar,
and is sketched in less detail below. As noted in the main text, the main diﬃculty in
proving this result arises from the need to deﬁne the tax/transfer function T such that it is
continuous on the space F of distributions. We proceed as follows:
1. Partition F into Fu, the set of distributions with mass at one point only, and FB, the
set of distributions with mass at two points. For all F ∈ Fu, deﬁne T ( ,F) ≡ y.
302. Any two-point distribution F ∈ FB is uniquely represented by a triple (y−,y+,ξ),
where y− denotes the lower mass point, y+  = y− the higher mass point, and ξ the
mass at the higher mass point. Observe that if a sequence
  
yn
−,yn
+,ξn  
is such that
 
yn
−,yn
+,ξn 
→ (y−,y+,ξ) for some triple (where yn
−  = yn
+ and y−  = y+), then the
corresponding sequence of two-point distributions {Fn} converges to the distribution
F that corresponds to (y−,y+,ξ).
3. We use this representation to deﬁne T ( ,F) on FB. Take ¯ y greater than the maximum
income achieved by non-investors when η < ˜ η, i.e., maxz∈[0,˜ η] f0 (z). Then if ξ ≥ 1/2
and y+ ≤ ¯ y, deﬁne a function t(y,(y−,y+,ξ)) by
t(y,(y−,y+,ξ)) = −y(y+ − y−)
2 exp((ξ − 1/2)(y − ¯ y))
while otherwise deﬁne t(y,(y−,y+,ξ)) by
t(y,(y−,y+,ξ)) = y (y+ − y−)
2 exp((ξ − 1/2)(y − ¯ y)).
Given t, we then deﬁne the policy T by
T (y,(y−,y+,ξ)) = t(y,(y−,y+,ξ))+ξ(y+ − t(y+,(y−,y+,ξ)))+(1 − ξ)(y− − t(y−,(y−,y+,ξ)))
By construction, T is budget-balancing: for all distributions (y−,y+,ξ),
ξT (y+,(y−,y+,ξ)) + (1 − ξ)T (y−,(y−,y+,ξ)) = ξy+ + (1 − ξ)y−.
4. Clearly the speciﬁcation of T above is continuous as a function of y and (y−,y+,ξ).
So for any pair of sequences {yn} ⊂ ℜ and {Fn} ⊂ FB such that yn → y and Fn →
F ∈ FB, then T (yn,Fn) → T (y,F). This same property holds if Fn → F ∈ FU.
For this, note that the corresponding sequence of triples
  
yn
−,yn
+,ξn  
must converge
to a point of the form (y,y,ξ). So T (yn,Fn) → y = T (y,F).
5. Thus far, we have deﬁned T in such a way that is continuous in both its arguments.
We now show it implements full-investment. To this end, we evaluate ∆T (η) for all
η.
31(a) For η < ˜ η, the distribution of incomes is (f1 (η),f0 (η),1 − η). Note that 1−η >
1/2, and f0 (η) ≤ ¯ y. So T is such that higher pre-tax incomes are associated
with lower post-tax incomes, and so ∆T (η) > 0.
(b) At η = ˜ η the distribution has mass at one point, T (y,Fη) ≡ y and so ∆T (η) = 0.
(c) For η ∈ (˜ η,1/2), the distribution of incomes is (f0 (η),f1 (η),η). Since η <
1/2, T is such that higher pre-tax incomes are associated with higher post-tax
incomes, and so ∆T (η) > 0.
(d) For η ≥ 1/2, the income at the higher mass point is again f1 (η). Provided the
externality in investment is suﬃciently pronounced, this exceeds ¯ y. So as in the
case of η ∈ (˜ η,1/2) it follows that ∆T (η) > 0.
Given this, the only stable equilibrium is at η = 1.
6. It is easily veriﬁed that the previous step remains valid even if f1 is perturbed slightly.
This completes the proof of the case ˜ η < 1/2. For the case ˜ η > 1/2, a similar mech-
anism works. As before, for all F ∈ Fu, deﬁne T ( ,F) ≡ y. For F ∈ FB, deﬁne
T as follows. Take y lower than the minimum income achieved by non-investors when
η > ˜ η, i.e., minz∈[˜ η,1] f0 (z). Provided the externality is suﬃciently strong, then if η < 1/2
then f1 (η) < y for suitably chosen y. Then if ξ ≤ 1/2, or if ξ > 1/2 but y− < y deﬁne
t(y,(y−,y+,ξ)) so that incomes are reversed. Speciﬁcally,
t(y,(y−,y+,ξ)) = −y (y+ − y−)
2 exp((ξ − 1/2)(y − ¯ y))
Otherwise, deﬁne t(y,(y−,y+,ξ)) so that incomes are not reversed:
t(y,(y−,y+,ξ)) = y (y+ − y−)
2 exp((ξ − 1/2)(y − ¯ y))
The actual transfer function T is then deﬁned in terms of t in the same way as before.
Full investment is implemented as follows. For η < 1/2 then there are 1−η > 1/2 at the
higher mass point, and the lower income is the investment income. Since by assumption
this is less than y, incomes are reversed and investment yields more than non-investment.
32For η ∈ [1/2,˜ η), there are 1−η ≤ 1/2 at the higher mass point; incomes are again reversed
and investment yields more than non-investment. Finally, if η > ˜ η then there are η > 1/2
at the higher mass point, and the lower income is the non-investment income. Since this is
certainly above y, incomes are not reversed and investment yields more than non-investment.
QED
B Appendix: Message Games
Let M = {m1,...,mn} be a ﬁnite set of possible messages. Let Λ(M) be the set of
probability distributions over M, with typical member
 
λ1,...,λn 
. For any λ ∈ Λ(M),
let suppλ denote the support of λ, i.e., suppλ ≡
 
mi : λi > 0
 
.
Write Fi for the distribution of incomes for agents reporting message mi, and let
G =
 
F1,...,Fn,λ1,...,λn 
∈ Fn × Λ(M) represent the joint distribution of incomes
and messages.
For use below, given a fraction of agents who invest, η, deﬁne Gη (ζ0,ζ1) to be the
distribution corresponding to the η investors playing mixed-strategy ζ1 and the 1 − η non-
investors playing mixed-strategy ζ0.
Formally, a tax/transfer policy that uses messages is a function T (y,m,G): an agent’s
after-transfer income depends on his pre-tax income y, his message m, and the joint dis-
tribution over messages and incomes G. As in our main analysis, we assume that T is
continuous in its arguments.
Taking η as given, and with some abuse of language, we will say that message strate-
gies (λ0,λ1) ∈ Λ(M) × Λ(M) constitute an equilibrium given η if for a ∈ {0,1} and
m ∈suppλa, then m ∈ argmaxm′ T (fa (η),m′,G(λ0,λ1)). That is, given the message-
income distribution G(λ0,λ1), every message reported with strictly positive probability by
investors (respectively, non-investors) is a best response given the investor’s (respectively,
non-investor’s) income level. Standard arguments imply that for any η an equilibrium
33given η exists.19
An equilibrium is an investment level η and a pair of reporting strategies (λ0,λ1) such
that (λ0,λ1) is an equilibrium given η, and such that
max
m′∈M
T
 
f1 (η),m′,G(λ0,λ1)
 
≥ max
m′∈M
T
 
f0 (η),m′,G(λ0,λ1)
 
if η ∈ (0,1]
max
m′∈M
T
 
f1 (η),m′,G(λ0,λ1)
 
≤ max
m′∈M
T
 
f0 (η),m′,G(λ0,λ1)
 
if η ∈ [0,1).
Proposition 4 Suppose that η1,...,ηk are the equilibrium investment levels given T. Then
there is a transfer scheme ˆ T that makes no use of messages such that η1,...,ηk are the
equilibrium investment levels given ˆ T also.
Proof
Deﬁne ˆ T as follows: for each η, deﬁne ˆ T (fa (η),Fη) = T (fa (η),m,Gη (λ0,λ1)) where
(λ0,λ1) is an equilibrium in the message game given η, and m ∈suppλa. For the equilibria
levels of investment η1,...,ηk, use message strategies (λ0,λ1)1 ,...,(λ0,λ1)k such that for
each i = 1,...,k, investment level ηi and message strategies (λ0,λ1)i do indeed together
constitute an equilibrium of investment-message game.
By construction, for i = 1,...,k, investment level ηi is indeed an equilibrium given ˆ T.
Conversely, consider any other investment level η / ∈ {η1,...,ηk}. Suppose for now that
η ∈ (0,1). Since this is not an equilibrium investment level given T, for any message
strategies (λ0,λ1) that are an equilibrium given η, then
max
m′∈M
T
 
f1 (η),m′,G(λ0,λ1)
 
 = max
m′∈M
T
 
f0 (η),m′,G(λ0,λ1)
 
.
19To see this, deﬁne a correspondence Z : Λ(M) × Λ(M) →→ Λ(M) × Λ(M) by
Z (λ0,λ1) = {(ζ0,ζ1) ∈ Λ(M) × Λ(M) such that for a = 0,1,
if m ∈ suppζa then m ∈ argmax
m′ T
 
fa (η),m
′,G(λ0,λ1)
 
.
 
That is, for strategies λ0 and λ1, the correspondance Z gives the strategies that have support over messages
that are best responses given G(λ0,λ1). Trivially Λ(M) × Λ(M) is compact, convex and non-empty.
Z (λ0,λ1) is non-empty and convex for all (λ0,λ1) ∈ Λ(M)×Λ(M). Finally, given the continuity of T, the
correspondance Z is closed. Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem thus applies, and implies the existence of some
(λ0,λ1) such that (λ0,λ1) ∈ Z (λ0,λ1). The strategies (λ0,λ1) constitute an equilibrium.
34But from this is follows that
ˆ T (f1 (η),Fη)  = ˆ T (f0 (η),Fη),
so that η is not an equilibrium given ˆ T either. The cases η = 0 and η = 1 follow similarly.
QED
C Appendix: Basins of attraction in the linear example
In the main text we presented a simple linear example: f1 (η) = η+x1 and f0 (η) = x0−βη
with x0 > x1 and 1 + x1 ≥ x0 − β. We showed that if the government is able to precisely
estimate the functions f1 and f0, then it can compute the income level
˜ y = x1 +
x0 − x1
1 + β
=
x0 + βx1
1 + β
corresponding to the investment level ˜ η = x0−x1
1+β at which investment and non-investment
incomes coincide. It can then impose the tax/transfer policy
T (y) =



(1 + γ) ˜ y − γy if y ≤ ˜ y
(1 − γ) ˜ y + γy if y ≥ ˜ y
and successfully implement full investment. In contrast, if the government misestimates
the parameter x1 by δ it misestimates ˜ y by
βδ
1+β and imposes the tax/transfer policy
T (y) =



(1 + γ) ˜ z − γy if y ≤ ˜ z
(1 − γ) ˜ z + γy if y ≥ ˜ z
(6)
where ˜ z = ˜ y +
βδ
1+β =
x0+β(x1+δ)
1+β .
As we discussed in the main text, whenever |δ| > 0 this tax/transfer policy results in
a stable equilibrium close to ˜ η. We also noted that the basin of attraction for this stable
equilibrium is small. Here, we explicitly calculate the basin of attraction.
35Under the tax/transfer policy given in (6),
T (f1 (η)) =



(1 + γ) ˜ z − γ (η + x1) if η ≤ ˜ z − x1
(1 − γ) ˜ z + γ (η + x1) if η ≥ ˜ z − x1
T (f0 (η)) =



(1 − γ) ˜ z + γ (x0 − βη) if η ≤ x0−˜ z
β
(1 + γ) ˜ z − γ (x0 − βη) if η ≥ x0−˜ z
β
.
Observe that x0−˜ z
β < ˜ η is equivalent to (1 + β)(x0 − ˜ z) < β (x0 − x1), or equivalently to
(1 + β) ˜ z > x0 + βx1. Likewise, ˜ η < ˜ z − x1 is equivalent to x0 − x1 < (1 + β)(˜ z − x1), or
again equivalently to x0 + βx1 < (1 + β) ˜ z.
It follows that if δ > 0,
x0 − ˜ z
β
< ˜ η < ˜ z − x1,
while if δ < 0,
˜ z − x1 < ˜ η <
x0 − ˜ z
β
.
As such, when δ > 0 there are three subcases to consider:
If η ≤ x0−˜ z
β , then
∆T (η) = γ (2˜ z − (η + x1) − (x0 − βη))
= γ (2˜ z − x1 − x0 − (1 − β)η)
≥ γ
 
2˜ z − x1 − x0 −
(1 − β)(x0 − ˜ z)
β
 
=
γ
β
((2β + (1 − β)) ˜ z − βx1 − (β + (1 − β))x0)
=
γ
β
((1 + β) ˜ z − βx1 − x0)
=
γ
β
βδ > 0.
If η ∈
 
x0−˜ z
β , ˜ z − x1
 
, then
∆T (η) = γ (−(η + x1) + x0 − βη)
= γ (x0 − x1 − (1 + β)η).
36This is positive if and only if
η ≤
x0 − x1
1 + β
= ˜ η.
Finally, if η ≥ ˜ z − x1 then
∆T (η) = γ (−2˜ z + (η + x1) + (x0 − βη))
= γ (x1 + x0 − 2˜ z + (1 − β)η)
At η = ˜ z − x1 this is equal to
γ (βx1 + x0 − (1 + β) ˜ z)
which is negative. It is strictly increasing over the range, and is zero at
η =
2˜ z − (x1 + x0)
1 − β
.
It follows that ∆T is negative if and only if
η ∈
 
x0 − x1
1 + β
,
2˜ z − (x1 + x0)
1 − β
 
.
Consequently, there is a stable equilibrium at η = x0−x1
1+β = ˜ η. The basin of attraction for
this equilibrium is [0,
2˜ z−(x1+x0)
1−β ). The righthand boundary of this interval lies a distance
2˜ z − (x1 + x0)
1 − β
−
x0 − x1
1 + β
=
2(x0 + β (x1 + δ)) − (1 + β)(x1 + x0) − (1 − β)(x0 − x1)
(1 − β)(1 + β)
=
2βδ
(1 − β)(1 + β)
away from the stable equilibrium ˜ η. That is, the distance from the newly created stable
equilibrium to the righthand boundary of its basin of attraction is proportional to δ, the
size of the government’s misestimation of x1.
The analysis of the case in which δ < 0 is similar. In this case, ∆T is negative if and
only if
η ∈
 
2˜ z − (x1 + x0)
1 − β
,
x0 − x1
1 + β
 
,
and there is a stable equilibrium at
2˜ z−(x1+x0)
1−β . The basin of attraction is [0, x0−x1
1+β ); again,
the right hand boundary lies a distance
2βδ
(1−β)(1+β) to the right of this equilibrium.
37